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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition t o  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that 
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
(i) Introduction 
When I was asked to present at this Conference what economic theory has to 
offer to the understanding of a knowledge-based economy, two opposite answers 
came to my mind. The first one was that in some sense , which I shall specify 
shortly, economic theory isintrinsically about knowledged-based economies. The 
opposite answer, which I consider at least equally true, is that most strands of 
current theory have very little to say by way of an analysis of the nature of that 
particular form of economy that one observes nowdays and the transformation in 
its knowledge bases. Some words on the first point might help in clarifying also the 
second one. 
One of the central objects of inquiry of economic theory since its origin as a 
discipline have been precisely the interactions among a multitude of decentralized 
agents and the ensuing collective outcomes. ( Everyone has heard of Adam Smith's 
"Invisible Hand" conjecture on the properties of decentralized markets ... ) But in 
an essential sense asking how a decentralized economy works is equivalent to 
asking how socially distributed knowledge is collectively put to work in ways that 
are not socially detrimental and, possibly, increase the welfare of everyone. 
A.Smith9s conjecture ( subject to several qualifications, many of which have been 
missed out by later theorists) was indeed that markets are able to elicit private 
knowledge, propelled by the pursuit of self-interest, and yield orderly outcomes, 
superior - in terms of welfare - to, say, an autarkic system of production and 
consumption. The point that an economy is basically a system of distributed, 
diverse, pieces of knowledge has been emphasized, among others by von Hayek. 
And, of course, this is also a way of reading the most rigorous formalization of the 
economy as an interdependent system, namely General Equilibrium Analysis as 
put forward in the 50's and 60's by Arrow, Debreu, Hahn, McKenzie. The existence 
theorems,there, are a way of saying that, among all the imaginable worlds, one can 
also coherently conceive of an economy wherein every selfishly motivated agent, 
by making the best use of his own information, contributes to "share its use" with 
all other agents in ways that are mutually consistent and also mutually beneficial. (I 
am provisionally using here "information" and "knowledge" as equivalent 
concepts , but I shall come back to this later ). 
So, yes, in this general and rather abstract sense, economic theory has always 
been about interdependences in knowledge-intensive systems. However, it is 
enough to check the long list of assumptions that one has to make in the canonic 
General Equilibrium (GE) model in order to fully appreciate the distance between 
what it says and the interpretative requirements of any one historically observed 
economy. ( Incidentally note that the very pioneers of the theory are well aware of 
this, unlike many of the following believers: compare the writings of Kenneth 
Arrow or Frank Hahn with any random sample of articles on the "Journal of 
Economic Theory" or "Econometrica". Indeed, when I see works on empirically 
applied GE models, I must confess I have the same feeling as when I saw a while 
ago at U.C. Berkeley the announcement of a seminar on "Applied Heidegger"!!) 
The long list of restrictive assumptions is also an indicative proxy for the 
phenomena economic theory is unable to account for - at least in that analytical 
format - ; the progresses (and regresses) that have been recently made; the humility 
that economists should, but generally do not, put into their policy prescriptions; 
and, last but not least, the healthy amount of skepticism that non-economists 
should have when listening to the economists' wisdom ... 
(ii) Information , Knowledge and Economic Theow 
As mentioned, GE is a very elegant, very parsimonious on the assumptions, 
representation of how agents use at their best the available information and 
interact with each other accordingly. But "information" is not an ordinary good 
which can be treated, say, like a machine tool or a pair of shoes (again, on the 
economic characteristics of information Arrow is a pioneering reference). Shoes 
wear out as one uses them, while information has typically got a high upfront cost 
in its generation but can be used repeatedly without decay thereafter, or there might 
even be learning-by-using type phenomena (as from the first to the n-th time one 
applies Pithagoras' theorem in High School ...). Moreover, information might be 
a ~ ~ r o v r i a b l e  , in the sense that other agents might have significant obstacles to 
access it (ranging from legal protections, like patents, all the way to the sheer 
difficulty to fully appreciate what a particular piece of information means: see also 
below). But information as such typically entails a non-rival use (in the sense that 
it can be utilized indifferently by one or one million people, which, again, is not the 
case of ordinary commodities like shoes or machine tools...). 
In my view, some of the most important advances of the theory over the last 
two or three decades have concerned precisely the economic consequences of these 
features of information. Without entering any detail, one might telegraphically 
mention for example the wide literature on the "economics of information" (cf. for 
example the works by Joseph Stiglitz); on "principal- agent" models, most often 
studying the incentive implications of imperfect, asymmetric information, on the 
grounds of otherwise quite ortodox assumptions; on the organizational 
implications of information-related transaction costs and collective rents (cf. e.g. 
the works by Oliver Williamson and Masahiko Aoki); and on "new growth 
models" explicitly incorporating the generation of technological information (see 
the contributions of Paul Romer and colleagues). 
For the our purposes here , let me just recall three major implications of even 
the most rudimentary account of the specificity of information for economic 
theory. 
First, the "invisible hand" properties of the canonic GE model do not generally 
carry over to economic models where the most restrictive informational 
assumptions are relaxed (for example on the perfect access to information by all 
agents and on the fact that information itself drops freely from the sky). So, the 
theory may easily predict equilibria and growth paths that are socially sub-optimal, 
systematic divergences between rewards and marginal products, and also the 
possibility of long-term unemployment. 
Second, the social distribution of information and thus the institutional 
architecture of the system matters a lot in terms of microeconomic incentives and 
aggregate performance. 
Third, by adding the highly plausible assumption of locality of learning , one 
easily obtains path-dependent models of development - at the levels of individual 
firms, technologies,industries and whole countries - (cf. the contributions of Paul 
David, Brian Arthur , Richard Nelson, Sidney Winter and, in general, 
'evolutionary models of economic change). Impressionistically, "locality" stands 
for the fact that you most likely learn by building upon what you already know (so 
that for example it is much easier to learn differential equations after having taken 
the course of calculus than without it.. ; or, even at an aggregate level, the 
probability that the next generation of microprocessors will be invented in the US, 
conditional on the past innovative performance in the field, is much higher than 
in Burkina Fasu..) . And locality/path-dependence stands also for the relative 
incremental coherence in the domains of exploration that individuals, 
organizations and possibly countries may attain (so that for example becoming a 
great economist does not make easier for you to become a good football player, 
being a competitive textile manufacture is not likely to help in competing in 
bioengineering, etc. ..). 
Incidentally, note also that path-dependence in learning is likely to entail 
tricky dilemmas between "exploitation" and "exploration" - in the terminology of 
James March -, that is, between allocations of efforts aimed at impoving what one is 
already good at doing vs. activities of search for uncertain novelties. 
Putting it somewhat bluntly, even simple accounts of some essential 
characteristics of information analytically shake the naive and Paglossian belief that 
unhindered market mechanisms yield the best of possible worlds . To use a term 
that I do not like too much, "market failures" are generally associated with the 
production and use of information. Intuitively, for this to happen it is sufficient to 
acknowledge the properties mentioned above concerning a) increasing returns and 
b) non-rivalry in the use of information. The former obviously tend to conflict 
with the idea that pure competition is normatively the best form of market 
organization (and also with the idea that competition can sustain itself as a viable 
market structure). The latter decouples the costs of generation and the benefits of 
use of information (after all, one could say that the cost of production of, say, 
Pithagoras' theorem was entirely born by Pithagoras himself, while all subsequent 
generations benefited from it for free). Relatedly, such a decoupling is likely to 
induce underinvestment in information generation (and attempts to tackle the 
problem via an increased appropriability of its benefits might even have perverse 
outcomes . .). 
Moreover, as well known in the theory, necessary condition for some close 
link to hold between (marginal) productivities of inputs,relative prices and 
distributive shares are decreasing returns with respect to the use of the inputs 
whose productivity we are measuring (even neglecting the paramount difficulties 
in the measurement itself). Again , the acknowledgement of the role of 
information as a 'factor of production' breaks that link, because of increasing 
returns and externalities associated with its generation and use (Has one ever 
tried to measure the 'marginal productivity' of Fermi and Openheimer within the 
Manhattan Project? Link them to their relative price? Account for their inputs into 
subsequent "atomic bomb production functions"? Well, it follows from the 
economic of information that similar overwhelming difficulties apply to the GM, 
or Microsoft or Boeing "production functions", and , more so, to their aggregation, 
such as the "US production function"). 
I would like to emphasize that all the argument so far can confortably rest 
upon rather conventional assumptions regarding in particular the 'rationality' of 
the agents - at least in their ability of making the best use of the information they 
access (whatever that means) -, and on collective 'equilibrium' set-ups (which is a 
very strong assumption on the collective consistency of individual plans). Some 
economists (notably those with 'evolutionary' and 'institutionalist' inclinations) 
depart even further from the canonic assumptions and suggest the following 
points (admittedly more controversial among practitioners). 
(i) A distinction is drawn between information and knowledce. The former 
entails well stated and codified propositions about "states-of the-worldW(e.g. ".. it is 
raining.."), properties of nature (e.g. "..A causes B ..") or explicit algorithms on how 
to do things. On the other hand, knowledge, in the definition I am proposing here, 
includes a) cognitive categories ; b) codes of interpretation of the information itself; 
c) tacit skills; and, d)  problem-solving and search heuristics irreducible to well- 
defined algorithms. 
So, for example,the few hundred pages of demonstration of the last Fermat 
theorem would come under the heading of "information". Having that, some 
dozen mathematicians in the world will have the adequate knowledee  to 
understand and evaluate it. Conversely a chimpanzee, facing those same pages of 
information might just feel like eating them, and the majority of human beings 
would fall somewhere inbetween these two extremes ... Similarly, a manual on 
"how to produce microprocessors" is "information", while knowledge concerns the 
pre-existing abilities of the reader to understand and implement the instructions 
contained therein. Moreover, in this definition, knowledge includes tacit and 
rather automatic skills like operating a particular machine or correctly driving a car 
to overtake another one (without stopping first in order to solve the appropriate 
system of differential equations involved !!). And, finally, it includes, "visions" 
and ill-defined rules of search, like those involved in most activities of scientific 
discovery, and in technological and organizational innovation ( for example, 
proving a new theorem, designing a new kind of car; figuring out the behavioural 
patterns of a new kind of crook that appeared on the financial market .. ). 
In this definition, knowledge is partly tacit , at the very least in the sense that 
the agent itself , and even a very sophisticated observer, would find it very hard to 
explicitly state the sequence of procedures by which information is coded, 
behavioural patterns are formed, problems are solved, etc.. This is certainly a 
major admission of ignorance on the part of the analyst, but there are good - 
almost 'ontological' - reasons for this : after all, as Arrow himself pointed out long 
ago, if an innovation is truly an innovation it is impossible for a finite observer to 
precisely forecast it. And, indeed, there are powerful uncomputatibility theorems 
that confirm this intuition. But 'tacitness' - some of us suggest - extends also to 
domains where little invention is involved ( as mentioned, driving cars, operating 
machine tools, debugging computer programmes ... , and even more so , efficiently 
running production flows, interpreting market trends, etc. ...). 
(ii) In modern economies, firms are major, albeit by no means unique , 
reuositories of knowledge . Individual organizations embody specific "ways of 
solving problems" that are often very difficult to replicate in other organizations or 
even within the organization itself. In turn, organizational knowledge is stored to a 
good extent into the operating procedures (the 'routines') and the higher level rules 
(concerning e.g. "what to do when something goes wrong", or "how to change 
lower level routines") that firms enact while handling their problem-solving tasks 
in the domains of production, research, marketing, etc. 
Dynamically, technological knowledge is modified and augmented partly 
within individual firms, and partly through the interaction with other firms 
(competitors, users, suppliers, etc.) and other institutions (universities, technical 
societies, etc.). 
(iii) Over the last two decades at least a good deal of effort - within the broad 
field of the "economics of innovation" - has gone into a better understanding of the 
variety of processes by which knowledge is augmented and diffused in the 
economy (Major contributions in this area include those by Christopher Freeman, 
Nathan Rosenberg, Keith Pavitt, Richard Nelson, among others). 
A first broad property - probably not surprising to non-economists, but with 
important analytical and normative implications - is the diversity of learning 
modes and sources of knowledge across technologies and across sectors. For 
example, in some activities, knowledge is accumulated primarely via informal 
mechanisms of learning by doing, learning by interacting with customers and 
suppliers, etc. In others,it involves much more formalized activities of search (such 
as those undertaken in R&D labs). In some fields, knowledge is mostly generated 
internally and specific to particular applications. In others it draws much more 
directly upon university research and scientific advances. I am mentioning all this 
also because recent research suggests that this diversity of learning modes might be 
a major determinant of the diverse patterns of evolution in industrial structures 
(for example,in terms of distribution of firm sizes, natality and mortality of firms, 
corporate diversification, etc.). Moreover, the identification of the sectoral 
specificities in the forms of knowledge and in learning patterns bears 
straightforward normative consequences (for example, R&D policies, or policies 
aimed at speeding up the diffusion of innovations are likely to have quite diverse 
effects in the textile industry or in bioengineering ...). 
Relatedly, an important step in the understanding of the "anatomy" of 
contemporary systems of production and knowledge accumulation has involved 
taxonomic exercises (Keith Pavitt's taxonomy is probably the most famous one), 
trying to map 'families' of technologies and sectors according to their sources of 
innovative knowledge and their typical innovative procedures. 
At the same time, one has tried to identify possible invariances,which hold 
across technologies, in the patterns of learning ( notions like "technological 
paradigms", "regimes" and "technological trajectories" belong to this domain of 
analysis), and descriptive indicators for these same patterns. So, for example, 
variables like the levels of "innovative opportunity" associated with each 
technological paradigm, the degrees of "cumulativeness" displayed by technical 
advances , etc. have turned out to be quite useful in interpreting the determinants 
of the particular 'trajectories' of innovation that one observes. 
(iv) Building upon the considerations made so far on the nature of 
technological learning and on the ways organizations incorporate knowledge, a few 
scholars have started to explore an explicitly co-evolutionary view , whereby the 
accumulation of technological knowledge is shaped and constrained by the nature 
of the organizations and institutions where this knowledge is embedded, and , 
conversely, new forms of knowledge demand and possibly trigger changes in 
corporate organizations and broader institutions. 
To sum up: it seems to me that various strands of research, within the fields of 
the economics of information, the economics of innovation and organizational 
theory have recently contributed a lot to our understanding of how knowledge-rich 
economies work (and ,equally important, of how they cannot work !!). However , 
the thrust of most of the works that I have discussed so far is a microeconomic one. 
This does not mean to say that they are void of macroeconomic content: on the 
contrary, it turns out to be relatively easy and highly promising to incorporate 
some of the mentioned findings on the economics of information and learning 
into macroeconomic models. 
So , for example, self-sustained growth can be shown to be a general property 
of knowledge-based economies, even indipendently from capital accumulation (of 
course, in less abstract models, knowledge accumulation and capital accumulation 
are interwined, and self-propelled dynamics, more so, apply ...). 
The introduction of asymmetric information into simple macro models 
generally yields "Keynesian" outcomes , such as persistent unvoluntary 
unemployment, credit rationing ,etc. (cf. the "New Keynesian" contributions 
pioneered by Stiglitz and colleagues). 
And an expanding family of evolutionary models , microfounded in a 
multitude of heterogeneous agents that imperfectly learn and are selected by the 
market, is proving capable of accounting for a wide set of aggregate regularities, 
ranging from the patterns of international growth of incomes and productivities all 
the way to "meso" phenomena such as size distributions of firms and their 
persistent asymmetries in efficiency (cf. the works spurred by Richard Nelson and 
Sidney Winter's evolutionary theory of economic change). 
All this notwithstanding, it seems to me equally true that there is still an 
enormous gap between the wealth of microeconomic findings, on the one hand, 
and the understanding that we have of how knowledge is distributed in the 
economy as a whole and the ways this affects its performance and dynamics, on the 
other. This holds at analytical level and bears all its consequences at a normative 
one. For example, the theory is still ill-equipped to tackle questions like the 
conditions under which "technological unemployment" emerges, the effects of 
particural patterns of technical change on growth, or the collective impact of 
specific institutional arrangements. Correspondingly it is particularly weak in 
answering policy questions like those concerning unemployment in knowledge- 
based economies. 
Let me briefly turn to theses issues. 
(iii) From micro to macro .... 
It is interesting to notice that within the economic discipline, the progressive 
attention, over the last 2-3 decades, to the intricacies of the generation and use of 
knowledge in an economy has been paralled, within a good deal of macroeconomic 
theory, by a movement in the o~posite direction. 
It is impossible to enter here the fine details of macroeconomic controversies, 
and, less so, their sometimes bizarre epistemological justifications. As a first and 
rough approximation, notice the following. It has been remarked above that most 
advances in the interpretation of the role of knowledge in economic coordination 
and change might be understood, with reference to a canonic General Equilibrium 
model, as more or less radical departures from its most demanding assumptions, 
regarding, e.g. the institution-free environment, the information available to 
individual agents, their basic omogeneity (apart from differences in their 
preferences and initial endowments), their rational ability to understand the world 
they live in, exploit the opportunities it provides and forecast the future. Well, the 
trend in a lot of current macro theory has been , if anything, toward increasing 
demands upon the rationality and forecasting abilities of individual agents, and 
toward assumptions of even greater homogeneity among them . 
As a rough but vivid illustration of this statement, it is revealing to compare 
any sample of intermediate-to-advanced macro textbooks, say, thirty years ago, 
with what is mostly taught nowdays (parallel comparisons of state-of-the-art 
publications would only reinforce the argument). In the former, you find a good 
deal of macro-statements based upon comparative statics exercises involving 
relationships among aggregate entities (e.g. the "aggregate propensity to consume", 
the "multiplier", the "accelerator", "IS-LM curves", etc. ... ). I personally do not find 
any difficulty in ackowledging the ad hoc nature of too much of that reasoning, 
the clumsy microfoundations, the appeal to unstructured intuition as the basic 
justification of even the sign of a derivative .. ( And indeed I still rembember my 
own sense of uneasiness having to understand for example the relationships in 
"Keynesian" models between interest rates , demand for money, savings and 
investments ... ). But, right or wrong, with hindsight, one must admit that there 
was at least some naive empirically-based induction and some institutional 
conjectures in those models , no matter how rough (for example they were 
stylizing some apparent behavioural differences among social groups, their 
differentiated impact upon collective dynamics, etc.). And they also displayed the 
most rudimentary form of 'informational imperfection' and 'bounded rationality', 
namely, - most often - crude adaptive expectations, "money illusions", and the like. 
Obviously, a way forward could have been a much greater refinement of the 
microeconomic foundations, interactive dynamics, information processes, learning 
mechanisms, institutional assumptions, etc. Unfort~nately~what happened in the 
maistream of the discipline has been the opposite ( for reasons - partly internal to 
the sociology of the discipline itself, and partly due to a broader zeitgeist -, which I 
do not have the time to discussed here ): the "rational expectation"/"new classical 
economics" paradigm is an extreme example of this tendency. 
So, most often, the enormous gap between the assumptions implied in the 
'General Equilibrium ' model of economic coordination, on the one hand, and 
observed behavioural traits and institutional conditions, on the other, is written 
away with an act of faith, and a more elegant account of macrodynamics is derived 
from the optimizing behaviours of representative agents. (This, notwithstanding a 
lot of handwaiving concerning for example the derivation of 'representative 
agents' themselves from a GE setup - cf. profoundly disruptive observations of 
Alan Kirman, among others -, or the general impossibility of generating models 
whereby even fully forward-looking, 'representative", agents learn their 
equilibrium behaviour ). Moreover, as regards the "rationality" attributed to the 
agents, thirty years ago they were assumed to be able to take moving averages and 
recognize the sign of derivatives; nowdays they ought to be able to solve 
complicated inter-temporal optimization problems ( or, at least, behave in 
equilibrium as if they did). 
I am mentioning all this for two reasons. 
First, from a theoretical pont of view, if one were to accept such a 
macroeconomic view, it would be an idle waste of time to discuss issues such as 
"the implications of a knowledge-based economy": simply put, no matter how high 
is the level of knowledge incorporated into any one economy, if agents fully 
mastered it, and if we also ruled out the specificities of information and knowledge 
discussed in the previous section, no problem would arise. Indeed, one could 
think of a macrodynamic summarizining a sequence of optimal adjustments by 
fully rational agents to exogenous shocks all the way from the Stone Age to the 
Microprecessor Age ( ..in this respect, readers not too familiar with exoteric debates 
of economists are invited to check the interpretations that the professional 
community takes seriously about e.g. the Great Depression of the '30's !!). 
Second, and relatedly, a good part of policy discussion draws rather closely 
upon the agenda set by macroeconomic theory: however, in the current agenda 
there is very little room for questions concerning for example the specificies of 
particular forms of socially distributed knowledge and their effects on 
unemployment, income distributi~n~growth, etc.. At the same time, there seem to 
be a dangerous tendency to derive policy prescriptions from the original acts of 
faith inbuilt into the theory regarding the self-adjusting properties of the economy 
(To caricature only a little bit, no matter what the policy problem at hand, one often 
hears the answer "...just let the market work..". But the questions are precisely how 
do markets work? how are they affected by different informational structures and 
mechanisms of knowledge generation? And indeed we still know very little about 
the answer). 
In brief, my view is that a major and urgent task ahead is a sort of 
reconstruction of macroeconomic theory building upon the rich insights on 
knowledge, corporate organizations, institutions briefly reviewed in the previous 
section (and of course drawing upon the quite a few existing macromodels that 
already try to do it). Short of that, I shall just put forward some scattered remarks, 
without any claim to coherence. 
Going from detailed micro descriptions of "knowledge-intensive" economies 
to necessarely more concise aggregate accounts demands also important 
commitments about the mechanisms of coordination and adjustment among 
agents who are diverse in terms of the knowledge that they embody and the 
institutional position they occupy. One way out, clearly, is to assume some implicit 
GE and get on with the job. However, all what said so far makes that assumption 
particularly doubtful. But then those mechanisms have to be explicitly identified 
and possibly formalized. 
As an illustration consider the following. Start as a reference, again, from a GE. 
There, the intuitive image of how coordination occur is a multitude of agents 
bringing their goods to the square of the village and trading with each other; 
"adjustments" occur via the way people "go up" supply curves and "go down" 
demand curves as notional prices change; and, finally, at the end of the day 
everything that there is to know is summarized by the ensuing prices. Moreover, 
with the appropriate modifications , one may extend the same image to a GE with 
production (with people also buying and selling inputs ) and to economies where 
people think of what they might want tomorrow (technically, things are much 
more complicated than that, but for our purposes this metaphor is sufficient). 
Conversely, a "knowledge-based view" is much more 'Hayekian' in spirit. 
People might still meet in the village square, but their purpose is not only to trade 
goods but 'to do things' on the grounds of their disperse pieces of knowledge 
(someone is good at designing engines and someone else at selling them ...). As we 
know, 'trading knowledge' is difficult because one cannot fully appreciate its value 
before having applied it. In any case it would be hard to price it due to increasing 
returns (And 'trading services' of people that incorporate knowledge does only 
little to mitigate the problem).Also, incentive compatibility problems probably 
emerge. Moreover, this is likely to be a world of complementary rather than 
substitution (design and marketing knowledge are useful only together ..) . And 
finally, people might augment their knowledge just by talking to each other. One 
can clearly see that in such a world 'going up and down demand curves', alone, is 
not likely to do the trick of coordination: one will require some further 
specifications on the way people get together, talk to each other, organize what they 
do ... That is , in order to understand how that system coordinates and change over 
time one will need to know much more on its istitutional architecture and on the 
patterns of learning . Even more so, all this would apply if one were to abandon 
the metaphor of the village square and rather assume that agents are also 
physically dispersed and interact with only a subset of the population. 
Unfortunately, current economic theory - even in its 'evolutionary' and 
'institutionalist' versions- still falls short of providing comprehensive taxonomies 
of coordination and learning mechanisms which could then be 'reduced ' into 
tractable macro models: so, in the above illustration, one would like to have some 
sort of archetypical patterns of the way people share their knowledge, sell their 
services, organize their production activities, etc., and then study the collective 
dynamic properties of different institutional set-ups. Promising theoretical 
attempts are there, but one is still quite far from the goal. 
Let me mention three rather different examples in this direction. First, one 
starts seeing exercises of 'comparative institutional analysis' which continue to 
share with the GE world the focus upon equilibrium situations and also the 
assumption that agents are entirely capable to make the best use of the information 
they get, but the interest of the exercise rest precisely in allowing different systems 
to distribute differently the information -therefore also providing different 
incentive structures -, and also to socially distribute different menus of available 
courses of action (works like those by Stiglitz or M. Aoki head in this direction). 
Second, a forthcoming generation of 'evolutionary' models - which are more 
"bottom-up", in the sense that they explicitly represent a multitude of agents which 
interact with each other without any prior commitment to any collective 
equilibrium - seems well suited to handle also thought experiments concerning 
the aggregate effects of different distributions of knowledge and different 
interaction mechanisms. Third, one finds in the institutionalist macro literature - 
especially French, under the name of "Regulation approachn- various attempts to 
identify and sometimes formalize a sort of historical taxonomy of "regimes" 
governing the interaction mechanisms in the various markets , e.g. products, 
labour, finance, etc. ( cf the works by Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Benjamin 
Coriat, among others). Certainly, the approach is much more "top-down" in the 
sense that it oftens starts from daring assumptions on functional relationships 
among aggregate variables (e.g. wages and productivity, income growth and 
productivity growth, etc.), but in fact, even beyond its contribution to historical 
analysis, it might turn out at the end to be a complement and a challange to more 
'bottom-up', behaviourally richer, models. 
(iv) By wav of a conclusion: manv more questions than answers on the 
contemvorarv economv ... 
If I were to end here I would simply summarize this quick overview of the 
contribution of economic theory to the understanding of knowledge-based 
economies with a qualified optimism on the ability of the discipline to shed some 
light on some important aspects of them. In particular, I have argued, recent 
developments in the economics of information and of innovation have brought 
important insights into the processes of generation and diffusion of knowledge, 
and their economic consequences, althought many streams of macroeconomic 
analysis are lagging behind in taking them on board. 
In the whole foregoing discussion, the emphasis has been put on the toolkit 
of analytical categories, models and conjectures that economists have to offer in 
general rather than on the interpretation of the specific contemporary trends. In 
fact, it follows from the perspective that I have tried to outline here that in an 
essential sense all economies that we know of are profoundly knowledge-based: 
they were a century ago and they are now .. But, with an adequate toolkit one might 
able to identify also what distinguishes the contemporary role of knowledge from 
that, say, which Marshall or Schumpeter were observing. Few crucial questions (to 
which I shall not attempt any answer), directly based on the interpretative 
categories introduced above illustrate the point: 
- how have the sources and procedures of knowledge accumulation changed? 
- have new relationships emerged between accumulation of knowledge and 
accumulation of physical capital ? 
- is it true that the balance between economically useful tacit knowledge and 
codified information is shifting in favour of the latter? and with what 
consequences? 
- what are the patterns in the social (and also international) distribution of 
knowledge? 
- how does all this affect market interactions? 
- if new modes and directions of knowledge accumulation are identified, what 
are their implications in terms of corporate organization and strategies? 
- what kind of new istitutional arrangements have emerged, if any? 
- and, last but not least, what are the implications of all this in terms of 
employment,growth and income distribution ? 
Note that it is an improved theoretical kit that allows us to pose with precision 
these very questions ( even if we are still far from satisfactory answers ! ). 
A general conjecture here is that one is currently witnessing a secular 
technological transformation which is affecting the basic economic mechanisms of 
demand formation, accumulation, employment generation and together the very 
fabric of society. The basic massage of this presentation is that, yes, economic theory 
can contribute to its understanding but there is still a long way to go. 
There are major analytical issues to which the economic discipline can 
potentially offer a lot but to large extent has not delivered the goods yet : consider 
just as examples the question of "compensation effects" of technical progress (that 
is, under what circumstances the employment-destroying effects of innovation is 
compensated by employment-creation of equal or greater magnitude?; or the 
stabilizing/destabilizing effects of faster/wider access to information upon market 
dynamics (e.g. what is the impact of new information technologies on financial 
markets and their boader consequences in terms of real aggregate variables and 
policy making ?). 
There are other major questions with respect to which economic theory can 
only be a part of wider interdisciplinary endeavours. For example, I do not think it 
is an exageration to say that the very structure of a democratic society rests upon 
forms of knowledge distribution that are not too asymmetric , allow a sufficient 
social mobility, and imply a reasonable ability of all citizens to understand the 
content of collective decisions. In turn, a urgent issue regards precisely the 
maintenance of these conditions also in the coming "information society". 
Economists can contribute to the understanding of all this, but only together with 
sociologists, political scientists, etc. 
So these conclusions are also a plea for scientific humility, or, putting it more 
vividly, given the current stat-of-the-art of the discipline, do not believe any 
economist who comes to you with simple answers and magic bullets !! 
This apply even more so to the policy level: after all, among the few things we 
know there is the fact knowledge-based economies are likely to always embody 
unexploited opportunities for technological but also organizational and 
institutional innovation. And it is also with respect to the exploration of these 
opportunities that a fruitful dialogue can be established between economists and 
policy makers. 
